Freezing Order: A True Story of Money Laundering, Murder, and Surviving Vladimir Putin's Wrath

“The Interior Ministry was effectively saying that the only person who had the right to report a stolen car was the person who stole it.”

The Russian Interior Ministry wouldn’t allow the attorneys for Browder’s hedge fund, Hermitage, to file a criminal complaint about the theft of their companies. Instead, the attorneys were charged with a crime for making the complaint. This is emblematic of the corruption of the Interior Ministry and its integral relationship with criminals.

“Every time someone does something in Russia, that information gets filed in quadruplicate with four different ministries. The people working at these ministries make only a few hundred dollars a month. As a result, nearly everything is for sale.”

Browder’s team needed records to piece together what happened to the stolen $230 million. In this case, the corruption of the Russian system, with bribes accepted, would help them get the information they needed.

“Everybody in the room understood that the regime valued money more than human life, and that every corrupt Russian bureaucrat kept their money outside of Russia.”

Browder needed the support of Russian dissidents for the Magnitsky Act to pass in European countries. When he addressed a conference that brought Russian dissidents together, they immediately grasped the value of the Magnitsky Act. This law threatened what the Russian criminals held dear: their money.

“I may have gotten off on the wrong foot with her, but I’d made my point. If the Swiss tried to stay neutral in this case, the world would know.”

Referring to a money laundering case implicating the Stepanovs, Browder used the press to put pressure on the Swiss prosecutor. After the story was published, the Swiss instituted a freezing order. When he met the prosecutor who was to proceed with the case, Browder had a film crew with him, which angered her.

“All of this proved our point: the Klyuev Organized Crime Group and the Russian government were one and the same.”

Browder emphasizes this theme throughout the book. Here, he’s referring to how the head of an international organization was willing to meet with the crime boss. That meeting could only have happened because the Russian government requested it.

“In a typical money laundering scheme, ownership is like a Russian Matryoshka doll. You open one shell company to find another, and that leads to another and another and so on.”

Tracking the trail of the stolen money was painstaking work. Money launderers use wire transfers and wash the money through multiple shell companies. The goal is for investigators to give up the search.

“Normally, when someone walks into the DA’s office to report a crime, they say […] ‘I’ve been robbed!’ […] They don’t come in and say, ‘I’ve been robbed! Here’s the robber’s car, here’s their license plate number, here’s where they live, here’s where they fenced the stolen goods, and here’s what they bought with the proceeds.’”

Browder and his team had done virtually all the investigatory work for the money laundering crimes that they brought to the attention of the US Attorney in New York. Additionally, they continued to do more research as requested. They were key to bringing Prevezon and other money launderers to account.

“Why would any of these firms jeopardize this gravy train by working with someone as toxic to the Russians as me?”

Several of New York’s best law firms weren’t interested in helping Browder fight the subpoena in the Prevezon case and get Moscow disqualified. Here, he explains that these firms were making a lot of money from wealthy Russians and didn’t want to lose that business.

“Over the course of the next hour, Judge Griesa mixed up the purpose of the hearing. He couldn’t keep track of who I was or how I was related to John Moscow.”

Judge Griesa, who was 83 years old, hadn’t read any of the written filings before the hearing to disqualify Moscow for a conflict of interest. He was annoyed with Browder and his attorney because they weren’t official parties in the case. Since he didn’t understand Browder’s role and past relationship with Moscow, he didn’t disqualify Moscow.

“They were more interested in knowing who was assisting him in his opposition to Putin than establishing who had killed him.”

The Russian authorities showed no interest in finding out who murdered Nemtsov because he was assassinated on government orders. They were interested in uncovering any others who opposed Putin. Later, they charged Chechens with the crime only because public pressure required a scapegoat.

“This was a remarkable statement. It was as if the Kremlin was suggesting that if Boris [Nemtsov] had been a threat—which, as everyone knew, he was—then it would have been perfectly appropriate for them to kill him.”

When the Russian public questioned Putin’s role in the assassination of Nemtsov, the official statement downplayed Nemtsov’s importance and claimed that he posed no threat. In other words, if he had, assassination was acceptable. Browder presents a convincing case that this was clearly a governmental assassination.

“I had to hand it to the Russians. They’d failed to get me into their own court system for years, but now they were using a US court proceeding, in which they were the target, to do the exact equivalent.”

Browder feared the subpoena from Prevezon because he didn’t want to provide the Russian government with any information that would disclose his informants and thus put them in danger. Here, he notes the irony of the Russians’ turning the tables on him when they were the ones accused of crimes.

“Boris had been thoroughly incorruptible. In a country whose foundation is corruption, this was his ultimate sin.”

Referring to Nemtsov, who was murdered, Browder draws attention to the honest Russians trying to take on Putin at great risk to themselves. Those fighting for justice and against corruption were turned into enemies of the state.

“Eugenia knew there was no way these two medications could cause multiple organ failure. If they did, tens of millions of people who suffered from anxiety and hay fever would be dropping dead all over the world.”

The Russian administrators at the hospital where Kara-Murza was taken after his poisoning claimed that his near death had resulted from his taking common medications. Eugenia, his wife, asked whether he’d been poisoned and was rebuffed. Although Kara-Murza survived, Browder and his team never identified the poisons used in the assassination attempt.

“Vladimir Kara-Murza, a good Russian, had come under the care of Dr. Denis Protsenko, another good Russian. And that had made all the difference.”

Dr. Protsenko saved Kara-Murza’s life. Browder again highlights the many good and brave Russians who sharply contrast the Russian oligarchs and corrupt officials, who care only about their personal wealth.

“Why had Putin gone to such lengths to protect a group of crooked officials and organized criminals? Because, quite simply, he was protecting himself.”

Putin benefited enormously from Russian money laundering because he had his close friend Roldugin put his name on Putin’s holdings. Roldugin had $800,000 of the stolen $230 million. Putin himself was linked to the crime that Magnitsky had brought to light, and that explained his extreme resistance to Magnitsky laws.

“Nekrasov’s movie was classic Russian dezinformatsiya. It didn’t have to prove anything. All it had to do was plant a seed of doubt. If this film gained any traction, then the Magnitsky justice campaign could be put in jeopardy.”

The Russian government sought to air this film in Europe, but Browder stopped it via libel laws. It aired in the US but didn’t do any damage. Constantly, the Russians tried to muddy the waters by accusing Magnitsky and Browder of crimes. This was just one example.

“Here was the man who had literally written the Magnitsky Act sitting shoulder to shoulder with the person whose mission was to destroy it.”

Kyle Parker, the Congressional staffer who had drafted the Magnitsky Act, was seated next to Natalia Veselnitskaya, the Russian lawyer trying to undermine the Act, at the screening of the Russian propaganda film in Washington, DC. Browder notes the irony but also draws attention to the presence of many supporters of the Magnitsky Act, including Russian dissidents, at the screening. For this reason, the film was poorly received and exposed as propaganda.

“For these people to use their considerable knowledge, contacts, and skills to assist Putin’s cronies in exchange for nothing more than money was even more contemptible than the actions of the Russians themselves.”

Browder is speaking of Americans, such as Moscow and Simpson, who are hired guns for the Russians. They’re under no pressure to work for the Russians and yet choose to do so for money. As a result, they enable Putin and the Russian oligarchs’ crimes.

“Putin now had his man in the White House.”

President Trump made no secret of his admiration of Putin. Browder feared what Putin had over Trump. There was no question, at the least, that the Russian government had interfered in the US election to help Trump defeat Clinton.

“For the first time, it all made sense: one of the main reasons Putin had interfered in the US election was because of the Magnitsky Act.”

Putin is estimated to have a $200 billion fortune, which has been obtained from corruption, and anyone who questions Putin’s wealth or power is denied basic rights. Almost all of this wealth is in the West. For this reason, the Magnitsky Acts, according to Browder, were a major threat to Putin’s wealth and power.

“Since Sergei’s [Magnitsky’s] murder, one of my main purposes in life has been to get corrupt Russian officials banned from traveling to countries like the United States—but instead here was Putin effectively using Interpol to ban me from traveling to America.”

Putin was dogged in his pursuit of Browder, causing him difficulties crossing international borders. Although Browder quickly got his travel privileges restored. the continued harassment and misuse of international law enforcement agencies kept those working against Putin wary.

“‘I think that’s an incredible offer,’ he said, suggesting he was ready to trade me.”

This was President Trump’s response to Putin’s offer to exchange the 12 Russians accused of election interference for Browder. It shows the deep concern that Putin had about the Magnitsky Act and Browder as well as Trump’s disregard for (or failure to understand) the law. The Washington establishment, including the US Senate, strongly denounced any such trade, which ended the threat.